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Torts
by John A. Gorfinkel*
"Torts" has become a convenient label for a wide variety
of wrongs redressed through civi1litigation. During the year
being reviewed, the California courts touched on almost every
conceivable phase of this subject. However, the space allotted does not permit even a cursory treatment of all the
decisions that might be regarded as pertinent or significant.
The discussion which follows is therefore limited and, in so
limiting it, we have tried to emphasize those areas where the
decisions indicate either that change may be taking place,
or is needed.
Medical Malpractice and Res Ipsa Loquitur
One of the most significant developments has been the
increasing approval of res ipsa loquitur instructions in medical
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malpractice cases. Two decisions, Clark v. Gibbonsl and
Tomei v. Henning,2 are particularly important. In order to
appreciate their potential, some review of the earlier cases is
necessary.
In a medical malpractice case, negligence consists of failure
to possess or use the degree of care and skill common to the
medical profession in the geographic area. s This standard
was long regarded as a matter requiring expert testimony;
the common knowledge of the jury could not furnish the
standard and could not permit an inference of negligence from
an unfortunate or unsatisfactory result. 4 Accordingly, res
ipsa loquitur had no place in such cases.
The first applications of res ipsa loquitur to medical malpractice were in cases where the injury affected a part of the
body remote from and unconnected with the area of treatment, or resulted from the presence of a foreign body in the
operative area. Classical instances were the burn from a
hot water bottIe, 5 the traumatic injury to a shoulder during
an abdominal operation,6 and the surgical sponge left in the
patient's abdomen after an operation. 7 In such cases, one
of the elements necessary for res ipsa loquitur was presentthe resulting injury was of such a nature that it could be
said, in the light of ordinary experience and without the intervention of expert testimony, that it was more probably
than not the result of someone's negligence. But when the
injury occurred during a procedure or course of treatment
administered by several persons, the other element, that it
was more probably than not the negligence of any particular
defendant, was absent. Ybarra v. Spangard8 had held, however, that this did not preclude the application of the doctrine;
1. 66 Cal.2d 399, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125,
426 P.2d 525 (1967).
2. 67 Cal.2d 318, 62 Cal. Rptr. 9, 431
P.2d 633 (1967).
3. See, e.g., Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal.2d
749, 205 P.2d 3, 8 AL.R.2d 757 (1949).
4. 38 Cal. Jur.2d Physicians, etc. § 96
(1957).
5. See, e.g., Trindle v. Wheeler, 23
Cal.2d 330, 143 P.2d 932 (1943); Tim168
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breIl v. Suburban Hosp., 4 Cal.2d 68,
47 P.2d 737 (1935).
6. Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d
486, 154 P.2d 687, 162 AL.R. 1258
(1944).
7. See 38 Cal. Jur.2d, Physicians, etc.
§ 98 at 728, 730 and cases cited therein.
8. 25 Cal.2d 486, 154 P.2d 687, 162
AL.R. 1258 (1944).
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if the patient, because of his condition during the treatment,
could not determine when, or at whose hands, the injury was
received, the burden of initial explanation was placed on the
defendants. Ybarra was followed by Leonard v. Watsonville
Community Hospita? and the doctrine was established that
if an inference of negligence could be drawn from the fact
of injury during an operation, then every person having control over the patient's body or the instrumentality causing the
injury during the period involved was called upon to meet
that inference by explanation of his conduct.
The next step, and the one involved in the current cases,
is the extension of res ipsa loquitur to injuries of such a
nature that common experience does not furnish a guide.
Here the landmark is Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hospital. 10
In Quintal the patient suffered a cardiac arrest during the
administration of a general anaesthetic. Common knowledge alone could supply no basis for an inference of want
of care on anyone's part. Medical experts testified that
cardiac arrest, although a rare occurrence, was a known and
calculated risk of giving a general anaesthetic, that it seldom
occurred when due care was used, but when it did occur it
could not be said that it was more likely than not the result
of negligence. There was also some evidence of specific acts
indicating want of due care on the part of the attending
doctors. Given this state of the record, a sharply divided
court approved the giving of a conditional res ipsa loquitur
instruction. This conditional form of the instruction permitted the jury to apply res ipsa loquitur if it found that the
injury was one that would not have occurred but for someone's negligence; in effect the jury first determined whether
there was a basis for the application of res ipsa loquitur, and
if it found such a basis, applied the doctrine. Twice during
the year under review, the supreme court again considered
this specific problem.
In Clark v. Gibbons,ll the defendants were the attending
surgeon and anaesthesiologist. The operation was for the
9. 47 Ca1.2d 509, 305 P.2d 36 (1956).
10. 62 Cal.2d 154, 41 Cal. Rptr. 577,
397 P.2d 161 (1964).

11.66 Ca1.2d 399, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125,
426 P.2d 525 (1967).
CAL LAW 1967

169

Torts

reduction of a severe ankle fracture. The anaesthetic wore
off prior to the completion of the operation, the operation
was prematurely terminated and plaintiff, as a result, sustained permanent limitation in the ankle. The court's opinion
recites testimony from which the jury could have found specific
acts of negligence. The surgeon and anaesthesiologist had
not communicated with each other concerning the anticipated
length of the operation; the former estimated a procedure
of two to three hours while the latter assumed the operation
would last two hours and administered a spinal anaesthetic
capable, in a normal patient, of lasting two hours, plus or
minus fifteen minutes. The anaesthetic wore off in about
one hour. There was evidence that, at the point the original
anaesthetic wore off, further anaesthesia could have been
given without harm to the patient. There was testimony that
in any spinal anaesthetic there is inherent risk, even when due
care is used, that the anaesthesia will not last as long as contemplated due to peculiarities in the physical condition of the
patient, but there was also testimony that if proper care were
used, the anaesthetic should not wear off before completion
of the operation.
It seems clear, from the testimony narrated by the court,
that the jury could have found specific acts of negligence from
the failure of the team to communicate, from the failure to
administer an anaesthetic adequate for the procedures contemplated, or from the decision to terminate rather than extend the anaesthetic. But the problem before the supreme
court was that the trial court had given the conditional instruction of res ipsa loquitur.
A majority of four justices, in an opinion by Justice Peters,
affirmed;12 the Chief Justice and Justice Tobriner concurred
in the result in separate opinions differing substantially from
each other and from the majority; and Justice McComb dissented. The majority relied primarily on the Quintal decision and approved the giving of the conditional instruction
in these words:
12. The Justices concurring in the
majority opinion were Associate Justices
Mosk and Burke and Retired Associate
170
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Justice Peek; Associate Justice Sullivan
did not sit.
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Thus, we recognized in Quintal that proof that when
due care is exercised an injury rarely occurs, accompanied by other evidence indicating negligence, may be
sufficient to warrant an instruction on conditional res
ipsa loquitur.
. This is particularly true where,
as in Quintal and in the present case, the injury occurred
as the result of a normal procedure such as the administration of an anesthetic, rather than from a complex
operation. . . .
The likelihood of a negligent cause is increased if
the low incidence of accidents when due care is used is
combined with proof of specific acts of negligence of a
type which could have caused the occurrence complained
of. When those two facts are proved, the likelihood of
a negligent cause may be sufficiently great that the jury
may properly conclude that the accident was more probably than not the result of someone's negligence. 13
The logic of this approach seems strained. It permits
the addition of two separate factors to produce a third which
is not necessarily the sum of the two. The happening of the
event is one factor; assuming that such an event does not
normally occur when due care is used, the event, standing
alone, does not warrant the giving of the instruction. The
evidence concerning specific acts which could be found to
be a failure to exercise due care is the other factor; these
events, standing alone, justify a finding of negligence but
do not warrant the giving of the instruction. How, then, does
the combination of the two permit the jury to infer negligence from a cause other than the specific acts of the defendants? This may be tested by posing a hypothetical situation, based on facts only slightly different from Clark v.
Gibbons. Would the court have approved the giving of a res
ipsa loquitur instruction if the defendants in that case had
agreed upon the approximate length of the operation as three
hours and then, although the anaesthetic administered was
13. 66 Ca1.2d at 412, 413, 58 Cal.
Rptr. at 134, 426 P.2d at 534 (emphasis
added).
CAL LAW 1967

171

Torts

normally adequate for the anticipated time, were forced to
terminate the operation when it wore off prematurely because
of an explainable (i. e., the patient was atypical) cause?
The facts thus assumed would negative the indicia of specific
acts of negligence recited in the majority opinion, but the
other aspect of that opinion-"the low incidence of accidents
when due care is used"-would remain. If this latter factor
alone is sufficient to warrant the giving of the instruction in
a case of this character, the criticisms of those not joining in
the majority opinion seems justified. Their view, briefly stated,
was that conceding that the premature wearing-off of the
anaesthetic was a rare occurrence, the instruction could not
be justified unless there was something to show that when
it does occur it is more probably than not the result of negligence on the part of some member of the surgical team. The
use of evidence of other possibly negligent conduct to reinforce the reliance on res ipsa loquitur was cogently criticized
by the Chief Justice:
Nor does evidence of specific acts of negligence justify
an inference of negligence based on res ipsa loquitur,
for the inferences the jury may reasonably draw from
the happening of the accident alone obviously cannot
be determined by evidence of the defendant's conduct. 14
The most challenging approach to the problem was that
suggested by Justice Tobriner in his concurring opinion. He
carefully established the unreliability of a statistical approach
to the use of res ipsa loquitur in this class of case, and urged
that such cases not be forced into the mold of negligence and
fault, with concomitant straining of doctrine and stigmatizing
of practitioners:
If public policy demands that defendants be held
responsible for unexplained accidents without a reasoned
finding of fault, such responsibility should be fixed openly
and uniformly, not under the guise of negligence and
at the discretion of a jury.
14. 66 Cal.2d at 422, 58 Cal. Rptr.
at 141, 426 P.2d at 541.
172
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I must conclude that, in this limited category of cases,
the attempt to fix liability exclusively in terms of traditional notions of fault has outlived its utility. Once it
appears that an unexplained surgical accident has caused
an unexpected injury, no useful end is advanced by rehearsing the ancient ritual of assessing blame. 15
Five months after Clark v. Gibbons, in Tomei v. Henning l6
the supreme court, in a unanimous opinion by the Chief
Justice, reversed the trial court for failing to give a conditional
res ipsa loquitur instruction in a medical malpractice case.
This rather quick shift from disagreement and dissent to uniformity and harmony bespeaks either a substantial difference
in facts between the two cases, or a substantial change in attitude on the part of those who did not join with the majority
in Clark v. Gibbons.
It is difficult to find a substantial basis for factual differentiation. In Tomei the defendant, a surgeon, accidentally
sutured plaintiff's right ureter in two places during a hysterectomy. This was not discovered for four days; corrective
surgery failed and plaintiff's right kidney had to be removed.
Medical experts testified that there is considerable risk involving the ureters during a hysterectomy, that surgeons try
to stay away from them, that the urinary tract can be damaged
no matter how careful the surgeon's actions, and that there are
procedures, before closing the abdomen, for testing the condition of the ureters. The court's opinion was brief. It held
that the conditional res ipsa loquitur instruction should have
been given since the medical testimony afforded reasonable
support for an inference of negligence.
But this result appears to be the same "boot-strapping"
technique so severely criticized by the Chief Justice in Clark
v. Gibbons. The medical testimony was such that the jury
could have found specific acts of negligence, either in tying
off the ureter in two places, or in closing the abdominal
cavity without using any technique to determine the condition
of the ureters. Nevertheless the jury had returned a verdict
15. 66 Cal.2d at 416, 421, 58 Cal.
Rptr. at 137, 140,426 P.2d at 537, 540.

16. 67 Cal.2d 318, 62 Cal. Rptr. 9,
431 P.2d 633 (1967).
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in the defendant's favor. Under these circumstances, defendant's counsel contended that any res ipsa loquitur instruction would have been superfluous. His argument was that the
evidence had pointed to particular conduct and had characterized it as potentially negligent; if the jury did not find negligence on that basis, how could it conceivably have used the
same testimony as a basis to infer negligence under the res
ipsa loquitur instruction? Counse1's argument seemed unassailable, but not so, said the court:
We do not believe, however, that a res ipsa loquitur
instruction would have been superfluous in this case.
It would have focused consideration on the inferences
that could be drawn from the happening of the accident
itself as distinct from the inferences that could be drawn
from the evidence of the specific procedures available
to a surgeon to avoid suturing a ureter or to discover
such suturing in time to correct it before closing the
wound.
Properly instructed, the jury could
pursue the answer to that question along two distinct
routes. It could ask what did defendant do or fail to
do that might have caused the accident. Under a res
[the jury] could ask
ipsa loquitur instruction.
whether it is more likely than not that when such an
accident occurs, the surgeon was negligent. . . . Had
the instruction been given, however, the jury might
reasonably have concluded that regardless of how the
accident happened or how it could have been avoided,
its happening alone supported an inference of negligence. 17
Under the facts of this particular case, the court is saying
that even though the testimony of the medical experts did not
convince the jury that the surgeon failed to use reasonable
care when he accidentally sutured the ureter, or when he
closed the abdomen without checking the ureters, the jury
could still find on some other undisclosed basis that the surgeon would not have sutured the ureter if he had used reason17. 67 Cal.2d at 322, 62 Cal. Rptr. at
12, 431 P.2d at 636.
174
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able care. And this, it is submitted, is the very proposition
that Justice Tobriner protested against so strenuously in his
concurring opinion in Clark, and to which the Chief Justice
objected in that case and in his dissent in Quintal. There
seems no valid basis for distinction between Clark and Tomei.
The unanimity in Tomei can be explained only as an acceptance by the entire court of the majority opinions in Quintal
and in Clark. But the concurring opinion of Justice Tobriner
still, it is submitted, rings true. This is not res ipsa loquitur
and it is not negligence; it is public policy placing the obligation of explanation on the defense and permitting the jury, in
its almost uncontrolled discretion, to impose liability if there is
any evidence of negligence plus any indication of an unusual
or rare occurrence.

What is Harm-Liability for Unwanted Pregnancy
Custodio v. Bauer18 is the first California case to consider
whether an unwanted pregnancy is a legally cognizable harm.
Plaintiffs were husband and wife, and the parents of nine
children. Defendants had performed a sterilization operation
on the plaintiff wife but within a year thereafter she again
became pregnant. The complaint stated several causes of
action, including counts for negligence in performance of the
operation, negligence in failing to apprise plaintiffs of the
possible ineffectiveness thereof, negligent and intentional misrepresentation as to the efficacy of the operation, and breach
of contract.
The trial court sustained defendants' demurrers without
leave to amend; the court of appeal reversed, holding that
each of the several counts contained allegations sufficient to
state a cause of action. 19 The opinion is particularly significant in holding that statements as to the effect of an operation,
while matters of opinion, may be sufficient for an action in
deceit or negligent misrepresentation, and for the view that
an express agreement to perform a sterilization operation
may place the surgeon in the position of a warrantor. 20
18. 251 Cal. App.2d 303, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 463 (1967).
19. Possible problems of election of

remedies were not considered at this
stage of the case.
20. Since the case, in its present
CAL LAW 1967
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The immediate thrust of the OpInIOn is two-fold. The
first is that sterilization, for personal as well as therapeutic
purposes, does not offend public policy and therefore an
action may be maintained for an ineffective operation.
The second is more far-reaching. Having determined that
causes of action were stated, the court considered the question
of the "harm" for which damages could be recovered. Since
these questions arose under the pleadings, the court was
understandably reluctant, in advance of any evidence on the
issues of liability and damages, to be specific on the items
for which recovery could be had. However, some fairly
clear guidelines were indicated. Thus the court approved
the propriety of damages for the costs of the unsuccessful
operation and for any physical or mental suffering or complications that might result from the operation or the unwanted pregnancy. The court also included in the area of
compensable damage, any loss that the present members of
the family would sustain in having the care, love, and support
of the parents spread over a larger number. To the extent
that such loss could be economically measured, it should,
said the court, be compensable.
Plaintiffs had also requested damages for the rearing of
the child. The court did not deal directly with this issue
which raises the most perplexing problems of public policy,
liability and damages. Since it is hardly arguable that a
child in our society is anything other than an economic liability
to his family, should the expenses of his upbringing be treated
any differently from the expenses of his birth? To what
extent should the economic status of the family be considered? Or the benefit conferred on the family in love and
companionship? Is the direction that the law may take to
be inferred from the growing social acceptance of contraception as a means to economic betterment of the family
unit? If we accept the principle that a family may be better
off, emotionally and financially, if it remains small, then
perhaps our courts are prepared to hold that a child who is
posture, is concerned with allegations
and not with facts, it would appear
premature to comment on the evidence
176
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conceived after an operation intended to limit the size of
the family is a legally cognizable "harm" and the doctor, if
negligent, may be held liable for the economic and social
"detriment" thereby caused the other members of the family.

Negligence-Problems of Duty and Causation
It is traditional "black-letter" law that before an actor
can be held liable for the consequences of careless conduct,
his conduct must have "caused" the injury. And it is also
"black-letter" law that the problems of "causation" present
two separate questions, cause in fact, and scope of liability
for the more remote or less likely consequences of the actor's
conduct, sometimes called "proximate cause." Unfortunately,
the language of causation in California decisions has been
replete with confusion between "cause in fact" and "proximate
cause." This in turn has tended to prevent a clear analysis
of what "proximate cause" is or should be. During the past
year, several cases were decided in which one or both issues
were presented with the mixed result that in some decisions
cause in fact and proximate cause were used interchangeably,
to add to the confusion,l while in other decisions courts
avoided the ambiguous language of causation and carefully
analyzed the problem in terms of the scope of duty and the
nature of the risk created by the actor's conduct.
It is hoped that the analysis and discussion that follow, by
focusing attention on these matters, may help in clearing
away a part of the semantic jungle that covers a good part
of this subject.
Cause in Fact-"Proximate Cause" Misused
"Cause in fact" should be used to refer to that act or event,
without which the result would not have followed. Unless
it can be said that "but for" the act of the defendant the
1. On the credit side, a brief acknowledgment to the court of appeal
opinion in WalIer v. Southern Pacific
Co. (54 Cal. Rptr. 421, 427, 3d Dist.,
11/11 66, vacated on other grounds, 66
Cal.2d 201, 57 Cal. Rptr. 353, 424 P.2d
937) for its clear and concise statement
12

of the distinction between cause in fact
and proximate cause. See also FulIer v.
Standard Stations, Inc., 250 Cal. App.2d
687, 58 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1967), discussed
intra under Duty to Whom and Nature
of Risk.
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result would not have followed, or alternatively, that the act
of the defendant was a substantial factor in producing the
result, cause in fact is not established. Assume a safety
order requiring a full stop, prior to entering the crossing, by
all trains crossing highways at grade from industrial sidings.
A IOO-car freight train, loaded with gravel, enters the crossing without coming to a full stop. It has violated the law
and such violation will, in most jurisdictions, be treated as
negligence per se; but if a motorist runs into the IOOth car
of that train, it can hardly be said that the train's failure
to stop had anything to do with the collision. Thus the violation is not a cause in fact. On the other hand, proximate
cause, correctly used, must initially assume that the defendant's act was a cause in fact, and then proceed to determine
whether the defendant should be held liable for the particular
consequences of the act. The distinction between cause in
fact and proximate cause is thus essentially between a factual
concept, and a legal concept. A defendant leaves his automobile unattended, with the keys in the car and the motor
running; a juvenile delinquent borrows the car and in his
ensuing joyride injures the plaintiff. The defendant's conduct is a substantial factor, a cause in fact, a setting in motion
of the chain of events leading to injury. Whether he should
be held liable is a policy consideration, usually subsumed
under the rubric "proximate cause" although sometimes
treated as a question of the scope of the duty owed by the
defendant to the injured party or whether the eventual harm
was within the risk created by the defendant's act. If the
foregoing seems unduly elementary, its justification lies in
the three decisions about to be discussed.
In DeArmond v. Southern Pacific CO.,2 plaintiffs were
guests in a motor vehicle and sued the railroad for injuries
received in a grade crossing collision between the motor
vehicle and defendant's train. The negligence of the driver
of the motor vehicle was conceded. The trial court, sitting
without a jury, found that the driver's negligence was the
"sole proximate cause" of the accident. Plaintiffs appealed,
2. 253 Cal. App.2d 732, 61 Cal. Rptr.
844 (1967).
178
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claiming that the railroad was also negligent in that it had
failed to sound the whistle at the precise distance required
by statute. The evidence indicated that numerous signals
and warnings had been given and that a wigwag crossing
signal, with red light, was in continuous operation from the
time when the driver was still more than 200 feet from the
crossing. Under these circumstances, the appellate court
viewed the trial court's findings as in effect holding that if
there were a violation of statute, such violation was not the
"proximate" cause of plaintiff's injuries. There is no doubt
about the correctness of the result. If the driver did not
see the train's headlight and the red light and the flashing wigwag, and did not hear a warning bell and a whistle, all when he
still had ample time to stop, then the failure to blow a whistle
a few feet further back from the crossing could not have
changed the result. Hence the failure to sound the whistle
at the precise point required by law was not a substantial or
any factor in producing the end result. The error lies in
the injection of that Ubiquitous adjective "proximate" into
the opinion where it does not belong.
In Hazelwood v. Gordon,3 plaintiff fell down a flight of
steps. It was claimed that the stairs did not conform to
applicable safety ordinances, but apparently the only defects
which existed were the absence of a handrail and the odd
width of the bottom tread. But plaintiff lost her balance on
the top step. To quote the court: "The violations of ordinances she alleged pertained to the hand-rail and to lower
steps. . . . Such testimony supports findings both of lack
of proximate cause for appellant's injuries, and of her contributory negligence.,,4 It is clear, from the court's narration,
that whatever defects there were had nothing to do with
plaintiff's injuries; had the stairs been constructed strictly in
accord with code and safety requirements, the fall and injuries would have been the same. It is equally clear, that
if there were any connection, in tact, between the defect in
the stairs and plaintiff's fall, then the injuries were within
the risk to be guarded against, and the defect would have
3. 253 Cal. App.2d 216, 61 Cal. Rptr.
115 (1967).

4. 253 Cal. App.2d at 219, 61 Cal.
Rptr. at 117 (emphasis added).
CAL LAW 1967

179

forts

been both the cause in fact and the proximate cause of the
injuries. Again, the result is sound, the adjective "proximate"
misplaced.
In Espinoza v. Rossini,5 plaintiff was riding on, and not in,
a motor vehicle in a manner that may have been in violation
of Vehicle Code section 21712. The evidence indicated that
he would have been injured to the same extent had he been
riding in the vehicle. "[W]hether this negligence," said the
court, "contributed as a proximate cause to his injury was a
question of fact for the jury to decide."6 Once again the word
"proximate" is misused and its use is confusing. The issue
was whether plaintiff's conduct, if negligent, was a factor in
causing his injury, and this was an issue of cause in fact
and not proximate cause.
Proximate Cause, So-called, and Nature and Scope of Duty
Given an act that is careless and a resulting injury to a
plaintiff, the issue may then arise whether the actor should
be held liable for injury of this type or to this particular
plaintiff. Frequently the problem arises because of the activities of other parties operating in the interval between defendant's conduct and plaintiff's injury, and the terms "intervening" and "supervening" cause are used. Sometimes the
problem arises without any third-party activity, but the result
is an unforeseeable type of harm or an injury to an unforeseeable plaintiff.
.
These are the problems usually subsumed under the concept
of proximate cause; while that term is not inherently meaningful or helpful, if it is to be used at all it should be limited to
that concept.
Several cases considered problems of this type during the
year; these cases are significant both in their approach to
the problem and in the results reached.
In their approach to the problem of scope of liability,
several decisions abandoned the language of proximate cause
and analyzed the issues in terms of the person or class of
5. 247 Cal. App.2d 40, 55 Cal. Rptr.
205 (1966).
180
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persons to whom the duty was owed, the nature of the risk
created by the actor's conduct and whether the harm that
resulted was within the risk created.
The most significant of these decisions is that of the California Supreme Court in Schwartz v. Helms Bakery Limited.7
The plaintiff, a minor child, ran across the street to buy a
doughnut from defendant's bakery truck and was injured by
a passing motorist. Defendant claimed insulation from any
negligence on its part on the theory that the act of the passing
motorist was the proximate cause of the injury. The court
refused to get into the semantic difficulties of proximate
cause. It viewed the problem "as one of determining the
nature of the duty and the scope of the risk of the negligent
conduct"S and cited with approval from Harper and James:
In a concrete situation an act or omission is negligent
because it carries an undue threat of harm from some
more or less specific kind of risk.
[A] professional generation ago the 'cause' reasoning was used
almost exclusively. But the problem is not one of cause
in any meaningful sense and the scope of the risk analysis
has been gaining favor in recent years with both courts
and commentators. 9
This clear expression of the distinction between finding the
defendant's conduct factually connected with plaintiff's injury and determining that the defendant is legally responsible
for the consequence may serve to lead lower courts and
counsel into a more accurate use of cause in fact and proximate cause. But even more significant is the approach taken
by treating what has traditionally been regarded as "proximate cause" as a problem of duty and not of cause. By so
doing, the issue becomes one of law for the court to declare
and not one of fact for the speculation of the jury. As applied
to the Helms situation, once the court had determined that
the itinerant street vendor owed a duty of care towards the
7. 67 Cal.2d 228, 60 Cal. Rptr. 510,
430 P.2d 68 (1967).
8. 67 Cal.2d at - , 60 Cal. Rptr. at
516,430 P.2d at 74.

9. 67 Ca1.2d at 236 n. 9, 60 Cal.
Rptr. at 516 n. 9, 430 P.2d at 74 n. 9.
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prospective purchaser, and this duty encompassed the duty
of protection against the perils of traffic, then the jury role
on this issue is limited to determining whether the vendor
used reasonable care under the circumstances.
Equally perceptive analyses of the issue of proximate cause
appear in Custodio v. BauerlO and Fuller v. Standard Stations,
Inc. 11 In Custodio, as discussed above, plaintiffs, husband
and wife, sued for medical malpractice when a sterilization
operation, performed on the wife by the defendants, did not
produce the desired result. Defendants contended that the
"damage, if any, suffered by plaintiffs, or either of them, were
not the proximate result of any breach of duty on their part
because of the intervening sexual relations between the parents."12 The court's answer was brief:
The general test of whether an independent intervening act, which actively operates to produce an injury,
breaks the chain of causation is the foreseeability of that
It is difficult to conceive how the very
act.
act the consequences of which the operation was designed to forestall, can be considered unforeseeable. 13
In Fuller v. Standard Stations, Inc., the issue was the liability of a vendor of gasoline to an intoxicated motorist who
subsequently seriously injured plaintiff. The opinion contains
an excellent analysis of the problem:
Current judicial analysis considers the outer boundaries of negligence liability in terms of duty of care rather
than proximate causation. The imposition of a duty
of care and its extension to the expectable conduct of
third persons is largely a question of law for the court.
Where existence of a duty is brought into question, its
affirmation rests in part upon social policy factors, in
part upon an inquiry whether the actor's conduct involves a foreseeable risk to persons in the plaintiff's
situation. [Cites] In the consideration of a general
10. 251 Cal. App.2d 303, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 463 (1967).
11. 250 Cal. App.2d 687, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 792 (1967).
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12. 251 Cal. App.2d at 316, 59 Cal.
Rptr. at 472.
13. 251 Cal. App.2d at 316-317, 59
Cal. Rptr. at 472.
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demurrer or motion for nonsuit in a negligence action,
the dispositive issue is usually the legal question of duty,
not the fact question of proximate cause. [Cites] This
Court observed in Raymond v. Paradise Unified School
Dist., supra (p. 6) [218 Cal. App.2d - , 31 Ca1.Rptr.
p. 850]: Divergent results are possible and judicial
disagreements arise by approaching negligence determinations through the gateway of duty, on the one hand,
or proximate causation on the other.
When the facts at hand are approached as a duty of
care problem, there may be justification for a rule imposing liability on a service station operator who sells gasoline to a recognizably intoxicated motorist. The operator is negligent as to persons beyond his vision when his
conduct creates a recognizable risk of harm to them.
[Cites] The element of foreseeability offers no problem.
There is no freak accident here, no extraordinary combination of events culminating in an unforeseeable injury.
[Cites] Supplying motive power to a drunk driver involves a recognizable, indeed obvious, danger to other
motorists and pedestrians. The assumption of foreseeability for pleading purposes does not prevent the defendant from presenting evidence that it did not know
or have reason to believe that the customer was drunk
and that it acted as a reasonably prudent person. Given
the foreseeability of harm to the injured plaintiff, the
inquiry then centers on the array of policy factors which
justify affirmation or denial of the duty.14
Duty to Whom and Nature of Risk
The decisions just discussed are clearing the way for more
accurate analysis of the problems involved. By avoiding the
proximate cause approach, discussion of "duty" and "risk to
whom" supplant the question-begging technique of leaving it
all up to the jury. Accordingly, further consideration must
be given some of the decisions just mentioned, as well as
14. 250 Cal. App.2d at 691-692, 58
Cal. Rptr. at 794-795.
CAL LAW 1967

183

Torts

others not previously discussed, for their analysis of the scope
of duty and the extent of risk created by a breach of duty.
In Schwartz v. Helms Bakery Limited/5 the plaintiff, a fouryear-old child, was struck by a passing motorist when the
child ran across a street to purchase a doughnut from defendant's sales truck. The driver of the truck operated a retail
route, selling pastries in residential areas. The plaintiff had
approached the truck a few minutes before the accident, to
ask the driver to wait while he went home for some money.
The driver knew where the child lived and told him that he
would meet him later, up the street.
While the truck was parked near plaintiff's house, but on
the opposite side of the street, the child ran out from behind
a parked car and was hit. The defendant noticed the child
about to run out into the street, but before he could call out
a warning the accident had occurred. At the trial, defendant's
motion for nonsuit was granted. The supreme court reversed.
The precise question of a street vendor's liability for injuries sustained by a minor patron from surrounding traffic
had not been previously decided in California, although several other jurisdictions have dealt with the problem. I6 The
elements common to these cases are: ( 1) a defendant vendor
who conducts his business in the streets; (2) a product that
appeals to children and a dispensing vehicle that is intended
to attract children by means of bells, whistles or distinctive
coloring; and (3) a plaintiff injured by a third party while
approaching or leaving defendant's vehicle.
The supreme court held that there were two bases on which
defendants owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. The first was
that in undertaking to direct the child by arranging a future
rendezvous the defendant driver entered into a legal relationship with him, thereby voluntarily assuming a duty of reasonable care toward him.I7
15. 67 CaI.2d 228, 60 Cal. Rptr. 510,
430 P.2d 68 (1967).
16. See 74 A.L.R.2d 1050 for a discussion of the cases and authorities.
17. See Prosser, TORTS, 3d ed., § 54,
at 339-343. Liability predicated on a
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voluntary assumption of duty based on
affirmative conduct is a familiar concept. In view of the element of express
direction present in this case, liability
based on this ground seems clear.

Torts

But the typical street-vendor situation involves no such
direct control, and it is the second basis of liability suggested
by the court that will probably prove more significant in future
cases. By soliciting plaintiff's business, said the court, defendant entered into an invitor-invitee relationship with him and
as such, the invitor owed a duty to the plaintiff to exercise
reasonable care for his safety while on the "premises." The
"premises" or area of invitation was said to be greater than
the defendant's immediate property and to include the street
and immediate environs over which the invitee might pass. IS
While basing liability on assumption of duty or solicitation,
the supreme court also cited with approval and discussed three
cases from other jurisdictions19 which, although reaching the
same result, had based liability on much broader grounds of
public policy and the duty owed children in general. It seems
significant that the element of direct control and solicitation
present in the Schwartz case are not apparent in the three
cases cited, but rather, the tenor of these decisions seems to
be that: "The responsibility of one who knowingly provokes
into action the natural recklessness of irresponsible children
ought surely be proportionate to the degree of danger he thereby creates."20
In Fuller v. Standard Stations, Inc./ plaintiffs sought to
recover when injured by the negligence of an intoxicated
motorist to whom defendant had sold gasoline. Heretofore,
this problem has usually arisen with dram shops or bars
who sold to an intoxicated person. Earlier California cases
had refused to impose liability on the dram shop operator,
holding that no common-law duty could be imposed to exercise care to avoid harm to such remote plaintiffs,2 and sug18. The court cited Kopfinger v.
Grand Central Public Market, 60 Cal.2d
852, 37 Cal. Rptr. 65, 389 P.2d 529
(1964) and Ross v. Kirby, 251 Cal. App.
2d 267, 59 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1967);
see also Prosser, TORTS, 3d ed., § 61 at
401-()S. ct. the discussion, infra, of
Ross v. Kirby.
19. Landers v. French's Ice Cream
Co., 98 Ga. App. 317, 106 S.E.2d 325,

74 A.L.R.2d 1050 (1958); Mackey v.
Spradlin, 397 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. App.,
1965); Jacobs v. Draper, 274 Minn. 110,
142 N.W.2d 628 (1966).
20. Mackey v. Spradlin, 397 S.W.2d
at 37 (Ky. App., 1965).
1. 250 Cal. App.2d 687, 58 Cal. Rptr.
792 (1967).
2. See cases cited in Fuller, 250 Cal.
App.2d 687, 58 Cal. Rptr. 792 et seq.
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gested that relief, if any were to be afforded, was a matter
for the legislature. Fuller is a case of first impression in California on the sale of gasoline to an intoxicated motorist. 3
The court was unable to distinguish it from the earlier dram
shop cases and bowed, it seemed a bit reluctantly, to precedent
and held that plaintiffs had not stated a cause of action against
defendant. The opinion's analysis of the problem was a
perceptive one. By approaching the issue as a problem of
duty and nature of risk created, it avoided the pitfalls of
proximate cause. The act of selling gasoline to an obviously
intoxicated motorist, said the court, created a foreseeable
risk of harm to other persons situated as plaintiffs were.
Whether there might be policy considerations militating
against the imposition of responsibility was not considered,
since the court regarded the ultimate issue foreclosed by the
earlier supreme court decisions in the dram shop cases. The
entire opinion seemed to be an open invitation to the supreme
court to grant a hearing and reconsider the matter; the invitation was not accepted and we must assume that the issue
of liability for such sales, whether by service stations or liquor
establishments, is currently foreclosed unless and until the
law is changed by the legislature.
Mallow v. Tucker, Sadler & Bennett,4 involved a more traditional form of the "duty to whom" problem. A firm of
architects had prepared plans and specifications for an excavation and failed to delineate the presence of an underground
high-voltage line. A workman on the job was electrocuted
when he came into contact with the line. The evidence supported the conclusion that the defendants had not exercised
due care in the preparation of the plans and specifications.
It was held that their duty to do so extended to decedent
as a person who "foreseeably and with reasonable certainty
may be injured"5 as a result.
3. Ct. Gonzalez v. Derrington, 56
Ca1.2d 130, 14 Cal. Rptr. 1, 363 P.2d 1
(1961), sale of gasoline in violation of a
municipal ordinance to persons who
used it to set a fire resulting in injury
to one person aIJd death to three others.
186

CAL LAW 1967

4. 245 Cal. App.2d 700, 54 Cal. Rptr.
174 (1967).
5. 245 Cal. App.2d at 703, 54 Cal.
Rptr. at 176.
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FlnaIiy, attention is called to Burgess v. Conejo Valley
Development Company,6 pending in the supreme court on
grant of hearing after decision by the Court of Appeal for
the Second District. Its potential impact, economically as
well as on legal concepts, is great. It involves a suit brought
by home owners in a tract against the developers and the
lending institution which financed the developers, for damages
arising out of the alleged faulty construction by the developers. The gravamen of the action was the existence of a
duty on the part of the lending institution to exercise reasonable care for the protection of the purchasers, with respect
to financing and controlling the developers. Since the case
is now under consideration, further comment would be improper.
The Guest Law
Three cases demonstrated the weaknesses and inadequacies
of California's Guest Law. So far as pertinent to this discussion, that act applies to any person "who as a guest accepts
a ride in any vehicle upon a highway" and is injured "during
the ride."7
In O'Donnell v. Mullaney,S the parties were attending a
picnic. Part of the trip was on a public road and part on a
private road. The passenger was killed while the car was
being operated on the private road. The supreme court
unanimously held that the Guest Law did not apply since
"highway" means "public roadway."
In Trigg v. Smith 9 and Campbell v. Adams,lO the courts of
appeal were confronted with cases of injuries to passengers
incurred while they were in the process of alighting from the
vehicle at the end of the journey. In Trigg, the passenger was
moving across the front seat in order to get out on the driver's
6. The Court of Appeal's opinion was
reported in 253 A.C.A. 186, 61 Cal.
Rptr. 333 (1967); the supreme court
granted a hearing on 10/5/67; the case
was on the calendar for oral argument
in April 1968.
7. Cal. Vehicle Code § 17158 (emphasis added).

8. 66 Cal. 2d 994, 59 Cal. Rptr. 840,
429 P.2d 160 (1967).
9. 246 Cal. App.2d 510, 54 Cal. Rptr.
858 (1966).
10. 250 Cal. App.2d 756, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 63 (1967).
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side; in Campbell, the passenger had opened the door and
had one foot outside the car. Trigg was held to be a guest as
a matter of law. Campbell's status was held to be a question
of fact for the jury.
There is no point in reviewing the O'Donnell decision on
the issues of statutory construction involved, or the Trigg
and Campbell cases and their predecessorsll on the matter of
the precise point in space or time when the "ride" ends and
the "passenger" is no longer a "guest." The short answer is
that it is difficult to find any rational basis for these distinctions. 12 Every rationale13 invoked for the justification of a
guest statute is applicable to the passenger who is injured
on a private road leading to a picnic area, or on the grounds
of a supermarket, motel or summer resort, or even in the
owner's private driveway. If a literal reading of the statute
requires differences in result when such differences cannot be
justified, the statute needs amendment. And similarly, if
"during the ride" is going to produce hair-splitting distinctions
based on whether the motor is running, or more of the passenger's body is outside, rather than inside, the vehicle,14
or whether the parties might reasonably consider the journey
at an end,15 some better language should be found to describe
the temporal and spatial limits of the guest statute.
11. See cases cited in Trigg, 246 Cal.
App.2d at 513-514, 54 Cal. Rptr. at
861 and in Campbell, 250 Cal. App.2d
at 759-763, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 66-68.
12. Unless it be the apparent antipathy of the courts to guest statutes and
their determination to limit them by application of the doctrine of strict construction; see Prager v. Israel, 15 Cal.2d
at 93, 98 P.2d at 731 (1940), quoted
with approval in O'Donnell v. Mullaney,
66 Cal.2d at 997, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 842,
429 P.2d at 162.
13. For an exposition of the standard
rationales of possible collusion between
passenger and driver, and of ingratitude
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for hospitality, see Harper and James,
The Law of Torts, § 16.15 at 961.
14. Note particularly the court's review of the evidence in Campbell v.
Adams, 250 Cal. App.2d at 764, 59 Cal.
Rptr. at 69: "The record discloses that
plaintiff testified that at the time of the
accident about one-half of the left side
of his seat and leg remained in the car,
that more of his body was out of the
car than inside it, and that his right
foot was on the ground with most of
the weight of his body upon that foot."
15. Campbell v. Adams, 250 Cal.
App.2d at 765-766, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
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Vicarious Liability
Poncher v. Brackett16 involved a suit against the grandparents of a minor child for injuries inflicted by the child.17
The complaint alleged the dangerous propensities of the child,
knowledge thereof by the defendants, and failure on their
part adequately to control or supervise the child. Prior
decisions 18 had sustained the parents' liability in such circumstances, but this is apparently the first case in California to
consider the responsibility of a more remote relative. The
trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend.
On appeal from the ensuing judgment of dismissal, the appellate court reversed, holding that one count in the complaint,
which alleged that defendants "voluntarily and gratuitously
assumed and accepted custody and control,,19 of the minor,
stated a cause of action. As the court viewed it, "The ability
to control the child, rather than the relationship as such, is
the basis for a finding of liabilitY,,,20 whether the defendant
be parent, more remote kin or, apparently, no kin at alP
Hamilton v. Dick 2 is another case of first impression. It
involved the termination of the liability imposed by Vehicle
Code section 17707 3 on the parent who had signed a minor's
application for a driver's license. Vehicle Code section 17711
16. 246 Cal. App.2d 769, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 59 (1966).
17. We anticipate the criticism that
this is not true vicarious liability and
that defendants are being held for their
own fault. We agree; the case appears
in this subsection for convenience.
18. See particularly ElIis v. D'Angelo,
116 Cal. App.2d 310, 253 P.2d 675
(1953).
19. 246 Cal. App.2d at 770 n. 1, 55
Cal. Rptr. at 60 n. 1.

20. 246 Cal. App.2d at 772, 55 Cal.
Rptr. at 61.
1. In this respect, it is significant that
the court relied on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 which is applicable (0 "one who takes charge" and not
Oll § 316, dealing with parental duty.

2. 254 Cal. App.2d 131, 61 Cal. Rptr.
894 (1967).
3. § 17707 of the Vehicle Code provides: "Any civil liability of a minor
arising out of his driving a motor vehicle upon a highway during his minority
is hereby imposed upon the person who
signed and verified the application of
the minor for a license and the person
shalI be jointly and severalIy liable with
the minor for any damages proximately
resulting from the negligence or willful
misconduct of the minor in driving a
motor vehicle, . . ." (254 Cal. App.
2d at 132 n. 1, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 895 n. 1).
A minor substitution of terms was made
in this section in 1967. It did not, however, affect the substance of the section.
See Cal. Slats. 1967, ch. 702, § 9.
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provides that the signer may be relieved from such liability
by applying for and actually obtaining cancellation of the
minor's license by the Department of Motor Vehicles. In
the instant case, the defendant had not applied for cancellation, but the Department, on its own initiative, had revoked
the minor's license for a series of vehicle offenses. Such revocation, it was held, had effectively terminated the minor's driving privileges and this in turn terminated the signer's liability
without his being required to apply for a cancellation under
section 17711. One word of caution is in order; this limitation is expressly restricted to a total revocation of the minor's
license and a suspension or other restriction limited in time
will not absolve the signer from liability even though the
driving takes place during the period of suspension.
Assumption of Risk and Contributory Fault
Grey v. Fibreboard Paper Products Co. 4 considered the
perennial problem of the admixture of the defenses of assumption of risk and contributory fault. Plaintiff, a machinist, was
repairing a paper cutting machine in defendant's plant while
the machine was in operation. He was injured when his hand
was caught in the moving rollers. The case was tried before
the court, sitting with a jury, and verdict was for plaintiff.
Both parties had requested instructions on contributory and
assumption of risk. The court instructed on contributory
fault, but not on assumption of risk.
The supreme court held that the evidence was sufficient
to permit a finding of assumption of risk and therefore the
requested instructions should have been given. However, the
failure so to instruct was found not to be prejudicial, since
"the 'assumption of risk' here involved is but a variant of
."5 To reach this result, the
contributory negligence.
court apparently assumed that assumption of risk would be
applicable to plaintiff if, and only if, he were found to have
unreasonably proceeded in a situation where he knew or
should have known and appreciated the risk involved. But
4. 65 Cal.2d 240, 53 Cal. Rptr. 545,
418 P.2d 153 (1966).
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5. 65 Cal.2d at 246, 53 Cal. Rptr.
at 548, 418 P.2d at 156.
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traditionally, assumption of risk has included conduct that
was reasonable under the circumstances, conduct that a reasonably prudent person, considerate of his own affairs, and
with full knowledge of the situation and its alternatives, might
engage in. 6 Plaintiff was a man with thirty years' experience
in working on heavy machinery of this type. Part of the
repairs consisted in smoothing the rollers by holding an emery
cloth against them while they were in operation. Plaintiff
declined the assistance of one of defendant's employees (who
could have stood by to stop the machinery, if necessary),
saying that the job could be better performed by one man.
Under these circumstances, it would appear that plaintiff
acted reasonably, but it would also appear that he acted with
full knowledge of the risk and the other choices available
to him. Under past formulations, this would seem to present
a case of assumption of risk, and not contributory faule
The entire opinion leaves the reader in doubt whether the
supreme court has (1) abandoned the traditional view of
assumption of risk; (2) decided the traditional view could
not apply under the particular facts of the case; or (3) simply
concluded that if a jury did not find for defendant on contributory fault, it would not have found for it on assumption of
risk. Until there is further word from the supreme court on
assumption of risk and its relation to contributory fault,
one should proceed with caution in citing the Grey case.

Owners and Occupiers of Land
The year under review was memorable; there were no
"attractive nuisance" cases8 and the decisions involving owners
and occupiers of land were few, with only two meriting
passing notice.
In Anderson v. Anderson/ the trial court had granted a
nonsuit on plaintiff's opening statement. That statement was
6. See PROSSER ON TORTS, 3d ed.,
67 at 451.
7. See PROSSER ON TORTS, 3d ed.,
§ 67 at 451.

analogy; see Schwartz v. Helms Bakery
Limited, 67 Cal.2d 228, 60 Cal. Rptr.
510, 430 P.2d 68 (1967), discussed
supra.

8. The term appears to have been
used in only one case, and then only by

9. 251 Cal. App.2d 409,59 Cal. Rptr.
342 (1967).

§
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to the effect that plaintiff visited defendant's home, at the
latter's invitation, to use the swimming pool. The pool had
been constructed by defendant and had a submerged ledge,
the existence of which was not known to plaintiff and was
not readily visible from the surface. Plaintiff was not warned
of the ledge, and was seriously injured when he dove into
the pool. The Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed,
holding that the opening statement stated a case of possible
liability. The opinion sets forth an extremely narrow basis
for liability, although the fact situation would clearly bring
the case within the rule of section 342 of the Restatement of
Torts.10 The court referred to earlier decisions and questioned whether the rule of section 342 was law in California.
It concluded that "a determination of this appeal does not
require the application of the bald declaration of the Restatement rule."ll The court considered plaintiff's argument that
the submerged ledge was a "trap," but decided that the theory
of a "trap" was limited to spring guns, steel traps, and the like
deliberately set by the landowner, and concluded: "The lack
of definiteness in the application of the term to any other situation makes its use argumentative and unsatisfactory. We
shall not engage in argument as to whether the condition
of the swimming pool constituted a trap. "12 The court disposed of the claim of defendant's "active negligence" by
limiting that concept to activity after plaintiff's arrival.
Liability was predicated, however, on a duty to warn the
plaintiff, under the particular circumstances set forth in the
opening statement. Those circumstances, as set forth in the
to.

The court quoted § 342 of the
as
follows: "A possessor of land is subject
to liability for bodily harm caused to
gratuitous licensees by a natural or
artificial condition thereon if, but only
if, he
"(a) knows of the condition and realizes that it involves an unreasonable risk
to them and has reason to believe that
they will not discover the condition or
realize the risk, and
"(b) invites or permits them to enter
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
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or remain upon the land, without exercising reasonable care
"(i) to make the condition reasonably
safe, or
"(i/) to warn them of the condition
and the risk involved therein." (251
Cal. App.2d at 411-412, 59 Cal. Rptr.
at 344).
11. 251 Cal. App.2d at 412, 59 Cal.
Rptr. at 344 (emphasis added).
12. 251 Cal. App.2d at 412, 59 Cal.
Rptr. at 344.
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OpInIOn, were that: the owner created or maintained the
dangerous condition; the invitation was extended to the specific use of the part of the land on which the condition existed;
the presence of the dangerous condition was not apparent
because of conditions brought about by the occupier of the
land; and the hazard was encountered while making use of
the land for the specific purpose intended. 13
As thus stated, the distinctions between the court's formulation and the Restatement may be subtle, but they are
significant in three respects. First, the owner must create
or maintain the hazardous condition; apparently there would
be no liability for a natural condition without some affirmative action equivalent to "maintaining.,,14 Next, the owner
must invite use of that specific portion of the premises on
which the hazard exists and for the purpose made dangerous
thereby; a general invitation does not suffice. Finally, because of the owner's activity, the hazard must not be apparent;
a hazard which is not apparent because of natural conditions
not brought about by the owner does not subject him to
liability.
The law has long been plagued by ultra-fine distinctions
in the matter of the duty owed by owners and occupiers of
land, both to persons on the premises and those using an
adjacent way. The tendency to formulate rules in terms of
refinements of the duty owed rather than in terms of a simple
duty to act as a reasonable prudent person under the circumstancesI5 has multiplied distinctions. The present case with
its refinements on the refinements of the Restatement rule
seems an unfortunate further proliferation of such distinctions.
In Ross v. Kirby/6 the duty owed by a landowner to a
business invitee was held to extend to abutting city property,
a public parking lot, used by defendants' patrons for parking
and easy access to defendants' premises. The scope of the
13. 251 Cal. App.2d at 413, 59 Cal.
Rptr. at 345.
14. See King v. Lennen, 53 Cal.2d
340, 1 Cal. Rptr. 665, 348 P.2d 98
(1959); Prosser, Trespassing Children,
47 Cal. L. Rev. 427, 466 (1959).
13

15. See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 3
L.Ed.2d 550, 79 S.Ct. 406 (1959).
16. 251 Cal. App.2d 267, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 601 (1967).
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decision is unclear and leaves open for conjecture and future
development several possibilities. The hazard was a "berm"
or ledge, constructed by the city on the edge of the parking
lot, but on the city's side of the dividing line. It had originally
been painted white to enhance its visibility, but after approximately six months the paint had worn off, inferentially, said
the court, from the foot traffic to and from defendants' premises. Two cases, Kopfinger v. Grand Central Public Market 17
and Johnston v. De La Guerra Properties, Inc.,t8 were cited
to support the decision. However neither would seem to
justify the decision. In Kopfinger, a patron of a market
slipped on debris on the sidewalk; that debris had resulted
from defendant's use of the sidewalk for meat deliveries to its
market. In Johnston, the occupier of the land had affirmatively acted to assume and exercise control over the area
outside the premises on which the hazard existed. The most
that can be said, with respect to the activities of defendants
in Ross v. Kirby, was that their back door faced on the parking lot, an awning extended almost the entire distance from
the back door to the property line and thus an invitation was
extended to patrons to enter from the parking lot.
The opinion leaves several questions unsettled. First is
the court's indication that defendants should have painted the
berm or otherwise acted to increase its visibility. But does
a property owner have a right, let alone a duty, to enter on
adjacent city property and maintain it? And would the same
suggestion have been made if the city had not originally
painted the berm?
Secondly, there is the broader question of how far the
court will extend a duty to maintain an adjacent public parking lot. Is this decision predicated on the fact that the berm
was on the dividing line and may have been designed to protect
defendants' property from water drainage?19 Would the same
doctrine be applied to low barriers within the parking lot
designed to keep cars in their respective lanes, or to an
17. 60 Cal.2d 852, 37 Cal. Rptr. 65,
389 P.2d 529 (1964).
18. 28 Cal.2d 394, 170 P.2d 5 (1946).
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19. 251 Cal. App.2d at 270-271, 59
Cal. Rptr. at 604.
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accumulation of oil resulting from cars parked by defendants'
patrons?
Strict Liability
California courts have not been reluctant to impose strict
liability on persons engaged in hazardous activities. 20 Smith
v. Lockheed Propulsion Co. l adhered to that policy and held
defendant liable for damages to plaintiff's structure caused
by seismic vibrations from the static firing of a rocket motor.
The court took the position that strict liability should be
imposed, as a matter of policy, to allocate the risk of loss
from a hazardous activity to the person who can administer
the loss so that it will ultimately be borne by the pUblic.
The court recognized that the doctrine does not automatically
subject the actor to liability without regard to place or circumstances, but found that risk of harm to plaintiff's property
should have been anticipated since defendant's property
bordered plaintiff's on three sides.
The court also considered defendant's claim for immunity,
since the activity was pursuant to government contract. The
court assumed that the United States would have been immune, under the Dalehite2 decision, but held that the defendant as contractor did not share that immunity.3 Two grounds
were advanced for denying immunity. The first was that
the selection of the test site, the construction of the installation and the manner of testing had not been specified by
the government, but were left to the contractor. The second
was that the court, following the Muskopj4 decision, regarded
any extension of the doctrine of sovereign immunity as contrary to the existing policy of the State of California. Still
20. The leading cases are Luthringer
v. Moore, 31 Cal.2d 489, 190 P.2d 1
(1948) and Green v. General Petroleum
Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952, 60
A.L.R. 475 (1928).
1. 247 Cal. App.2d 774, 56 Cal. Rptr.
128 (1967).
2. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S.
15, 97 L.Ed. 1427, 73 S.Ct. 956 (1953).

3. "The question whether the contractor shares the immunity of the United
States probably presents a federal question. . . . Our research has failed to
reveal any federal cases on this issue_
. . ." 247 Cal. App.2d at 787 n. 5,
56 Cal. Rptr. at 139 n. 6.
4. Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist.,
55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 359 P.
2d 457 (1961).
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to be determined is whether the United States Government,
either as a matter of inherent federal supremacy or as a
matter of contractual or legislative policy, will assert a claim
of immunity on behalf of its contractors in similar cases.
Emotional Distress-Negligent and Intentional
Two cases considered significant aspects of the right to
recover for the infliction of emotional distress or disturbance;
neither is a wholly satisfactory resolution of the problem
presented.
In Vanoni v. Western Airlines,5 the claim was for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. The basis of plaintiff's complaint was the negligent operation by defendant of an airplane, causing plaintiffs as passengers to believe there was
mechanical trouble which might cause the plane to crash.
Each plaintiff alleged that, as a result, he sustained "grievous
mental suffering, anguish and anxiety and suffered severe
shock to his nerves and nervous system and suffered other
In]uries.
."6 The trial court entered judgment of dismissal after sustaining a general demurrer without leave to
amend. The court of appeal reversed, holding the complaint
stated a cause of action.
The decision recognized that Amaya v. Home Ice7 had
established the "no impact" rule in California, permitting
recovery for fright or shock due to defendant's negligent
conduct, without the necessity of establishing a physical
impact on plaintiff. But the court then concluded that in
cases of negligent8 conduct "there can be no recovery for
emotional distress or mental suffering unaccompanied by physical harm.,,9 However, in the instant case, the court stated
5. 247 Cal. App.2d 793, 56 Cal. Rptr.
115 (1967).
6. 247 Cal. App.2d at 794, 56 Cal.
Rptr. at 116.
7. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal.2d 295, 29 Cal. Rptr.
33, 379 P.2d 513 (1963).
8. Ct. on intentional infliction of
emotional disturbance, State Rubbish
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Collectors Assoc. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d
330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952), indicating recovery may be had without proof of
physical harm, but nonetheless noting
that the injured party had suffered nausea as well as fright.
9. 247 Cal. App.2d at 795, 56 Cal.
Rptr. at 116.
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that such physical harm had been adequately alleged, and
quoted from Sloane v. Southern California Ry., decided in
1896, to the effect "that a nervous shock or paroxysm, or a
disturbance of the nervous system, is distinct from mental
anguish, and falls within the physiological, rather than the
psychological, branch of the human organism."lo
It is rather surprising to find a court relying on the judiciary
rather than the medical profession, and more particularly,
in view of the growth of medical knowledge in recent times,
on a decision rendered in 1896, for the determination of
what are physiological and what are psychological disturbances of the human organism. Furthermore, it is extremely
questionable whether the purported distinction is at all meaningful. It is generally accepted medical knowledge that every
emotional disturbance has some physiological effectsl l and,
conversely, many physiological effects may be due primarily
to emotional disturbances. 12 To suggest that there is some
clear line of demarcation between the two, or between nervous
disturbances and emotional disturbances, is to inject into the
law a dichotomy without a scientific foundation. In addition,
taking the opinion as written, all that is required is that
pleader and witnesses be cautious in their choice of words
so that some scintilla of physical harm is pleaded and proven. 13
Finally, one well may ask whether, if this distinction is to
followed, any purpose is served by a legal doctrine that
seeks to dichotomize between physiological and psychological
injuries, between an injury to the body and an injury to the
emotional system (whatever that may be), and denies recovery for the latter.
The other case in this area was Spackman v. Good,14 a suit
for intentional infliction of emotional disturbance. The suit

~_

10. 111 Cal. at 680, 44 P. at 322
(1896).
11. See, generally, Dunbar, EMOTIONS AND BODILY CHANGES (4th ed.
1954), and C. Wahl, NEW DIMENSIONS
IN PSYCHOSOMATIC MEDICINE (1964).
12. See, generally, C. Best, and N.
Taylor, THE PHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS OF
MEDICAL PRACTICE (7th ed. 1961); and

T. Harrison, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL
MEDICINE (5th ed. 1966).
13. As witness the statement in the
Siliznofj opinion, that the aggrieved party "because of the fright . . . became ill and vomited several times."
(38 Cal.2d at 335, 240 P.2d at 284.)
14. 245 Cal. App.2d 518, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 78 (1966).
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was brought by the guardian of two minor children, based
on the alleged outrageous conduct of defendant towards the
children resulting in their becoming psychopathic. The conduct involved was narrated over several pages of the court's
opinion; it cannot even be summarized without unduly extending the discussion. Suffice to say, it consisted of a course
of conduct on defendant's part that led to his plea of guilty
on the charge of contributing to the delinquency of one of
the plaintiffs and to his subsequent commitment for observation as a sexual psychopath. The trial resulted in a verdict
for the plaintiffs. On appeal from the judgment on the verdict,
the court of appeal reversed, with directions to enter judgment
for the defendant on the grounds that:
The evidence is not sufficient to establish defendant's
misconduct was the cause of plaintiffs' mental state, that
defendant acted with intent to cause this condition, or
that his action was of such a nature he should have
anticipated it was likely to cause that condition. In
light of these conclusions, the order denying defendant's
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was
error. 15
The result, as thus stated, presents several distinct problems; first is the defendant's "intent." Here it seems the
court applied an erroneous test. Even if the defendant did
not act with the intent of causing plaintiff to become a psychopathic personality, it seems clear that any adult would have
realized that conduct of the type described in the court's
opinion was "substantially certain"16 to cause serious emotional distress or disturbance to either a fifteen-year-old girl
or a thirteen-year-old boy, and the substantial certainty test
satisfies the intent requirement. 17
15. 245 Cal. App.2d at 534, 54 Cal.
Rptr. at 88.
16. "The word 'intent' is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to
denote that the actor desires to cause
consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are sub198
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stantially certain to result from it." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) § 8A.
17. The opinion, in n. 4, 245 Cal.
App.2d at 530, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 85, refers to various substitutes for "intent"
such as reckless or wilful disregard of
the consequences, knowledge by a rea-
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Second is the matter of causation. Here it seems the court
placed an impossible burden on plaintiffs. There was evidence by a psychiatrist and a psychologist that plaintiffs were
emotionally disturbed and had sustained what was termed
"sex trauma" during a period of time that coincided with
defendant's activities. There were other forces operative
during the same period, including a contested divorce between
the plaintiffs' parents. The court concluded, as a matter of
law, that there was insufficient proof of causal connection,
since plaintiffs' condition could have been produced by forces
other than defendant's conduct. It is submitted that in this
regard the court was in error. When two forces are operative,
the actor who is responsible for one of those forces does not
escape liability, if his conduct is sufficient to produce the
result, merely by showing that another force might have
produced the result. IS
Finally, there is the question of the court's approach to
the entire problem presented by the Spackman case. This
was a case based on intentional and not negligent infliction
of emotional disturbance and hence, even under the narrow
limitations of prior decisions, recovery could be had for
"psychological" or "psychopathic" injuries without proof of
"physiological" harm. This the court recognized,19 but it
seems to have nullified that recognition by its deep-seated
sonable person that the result would follow, and others. The court simply concluded that the proven misconduct of
defendant was not such as the actor
would recognize as likely to cause emotional distress or disturbance. But query, was this so clear that the court, as
a matter of law, should override the
jury verdict?
18. C/. the historic case of Summers
v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1, 5
A.L.R.2d 91 (1948), holding both defendants liable when they simultaneously fired shots, only one of which struck
p:aintiff. A closely analogous case, Orser v. Vierra, 252 Cal. App.2d - , 60
Cal. Rptr. 708 (1967), applied the same

reasoning when defendants were alternately firing the same weapon and decedent was killed at some time during
the period of shooting. And finally a
most interesting case on cause in fact,
State of Maryland v. Manor Real Estate, etc., 176 F.2d 414 (4th Cir. [1949]),
where decedent contracted typhoid while
a resident of a housing development and
the presence of rats which might have
been carriers of infected fleas which
might have transmitted the disease was
regarded as sufficient proof of causal
connection.
19. 245 Cal. App.2d at 528-529, 54
Cal. Rptr. at 84-85.
CAL LAW 1967

199

Torts

scepticism with respect to proof of causal connection when
"no organic injury was present.,,20
The result is that although the paths followed are different,
both courts were concerned with the distinction between the
physical and psychological and were reluctant to permit recovery for injuries to the personality as distinguished from injuries to the person. This, it is submitted, is the use of
Nineteenth Century medical concepts in a Twentieth Century
setting.
Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process
Meadows v. Bakersfield Savings & Loan Associationl was
an action for abuse of process arising out of the alleged
wrongful recordation of a notice of default and election to
sell under a security deed of trust. No claim of slander of
title was made. A nonsuit was granted and affirmed on
appeal, the court holding that the notice in question did not
constitute "process". The opinion stated:
[T]he essence of the tort 'abuse of process' lies in
the misuse of the power of the court; it is an act done
in the name of the court and under its authority for the
purpose of perpetrating an injustice. Since defendant
took no action pursuant to authority of court, directly
or by ancillary proceedings, no judicial process was
abused . . . we find no case extending the definition
of 'process' to a proceeding that in nowise emanates from
or rests upon the authority or jurisdiction of a court. 2

This language once again raises the question of the scope
of abuse of process in California. An earlier decision, Tranchina v. Arcinas,3 allowed an action for abuse of process
when the defendant, as lessor, had procured an eviction certificate from the rent control authorities on the claim that he
intended to occupy the premises himself, then brought eviction proceedings, obtained a writ of possession and re-rented
20. 245 Cal. App.2d at 528, 54 Cal.
Rptr. at 84.
1. 250 Cal. App.2d 749, 59 Cal. Rptr.
34 (1967).
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2. 250 Cal. App.2d at 753, 59 Cal.
Rptr. at 37 (emphasis added).
3. 78 Cal. App.2d 522, 178 P.2d 65
(1947).

Torts

the premises at a higher rental. The opinion was carefully
limited, holding that the process that was abused was the
writ of possession and not the eviction certificate.
It is submitted that this approach is unduly restrictive.
The Restatement4 and the text writers5 speak of this tort as
an abuse of legal process. And the process of the law would
have been no less perverted in Trachina if the lessee had
vacated, either after being served with the eviction certificate
or after judgment in the action, without awaiting the issuing
of a writ of possession.
In the Meadows case, the recordation of the notice of
breach and election to sell could have caused the loss of the
legal title just as effectively as a mortgage foreclosure suit,
or could have been used (as was alleged) to coerce plaintiff
into paying more than plaintiff asserted was due.
It may be that it is unnecessary, as the court suggests,
to extend the action for abuse of process to the Meadows
situation, since plaintiff could have been fully protected
through an action for breach of contract. However, a broader
question remains. This opinion, as have prior ones, by continuing to limit the action to the abuse of judicial process,
precludes recovery for abuse of administrative process, 6 and
this limitation, it is suggested, is neither desirable nor necessary. The present rule should be replaced by a doctrine
allowing recovery for abuse of at least any legal process.
Defamation

When will a statement, clearly defamatory on its face,
be limited by the circumstances surrounding its publication?
This question was raised in Arno v. Stewart,7 where the
plaintiff, an entertainer, was introduced on defendant's television program as a member of the Mafia. The uncontra4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
682.
5. See, e.g., Harper & James, THE
LAW OF TORTS, § 4.9 at 330, and particularly at 332.
6. It should be noted that an action
for the analogous tort of malicious pros§

ecution will lie when the proceedings
are before an administrative agency;
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 680; Harper & James, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 4.10 at 332, 333.
7. 245 Cal. App.2d 955,54 Cal. Rptr.
392 (1966).
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dieted evidence was that the statement was made in a friendly
and joking manner. At the trial the plaintiff requested a
jury instruction that would have established the defamatory
nature of the statement as a matter of law. This was refused,
and from an adverse judgment plaintiff appealed.
The Court of Appeal of the First District (Division One)
conceded that an unqualified accusation of membership in
the Mafia would probably be defamatory on its face, either
as imputing the commission of a crime or injuring plaintiff
in his business or profession, 8 but held that the statement
could be qualified by the jocular manner in which it was
uttered.
The fact that a defamer intends his statement to be a joke
will not necessarily shield him from liability; humor and
ridicule are common vehicles for defamation. 9 There must,
however, be a defamatory meaning conveyed, and the question
of humor is germane to the issue of whether the audience
understood the statement to be in jest and therefore nondefamatory.lo In judging the effect of a communication, the
context and surrounding circumstances must be considered. l l
These were held to be matters for the jury which could reasonably find this non-defamatory if the audience had recognized
it as a joke.
A second defamation case decided by the same court,
Cameron v. Wernick,12 indicates the breadth of the definition
of defamation and the extent to which it may include almost
any language which, upon its face, has the tendency to injure
a man's reputation, either generally or with respect to his
occupation.
The alleged defamation in the Cameron case appeared in
a magazine article which attributed to plaintiff, an author,
8. Cal. Civ. Code § 46; White v. Valenta, 234 Cal. App.2d 243, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 241, 13 A.L.R.3d 1271 (1965).
9. Prosser, TORTS, 3d ed., §§ 106,
759, 760. The classic case is that of
the gentleman rider and the Camel cigarette ad: Burton v. Crowell Publishing
Co., 82 F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1936).
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10. Prosser, TORTS, 3d ed., §§ 106,
763, 764.
11. See, e.g., Bettner v Holt, 70 Cal.
270, 11 P. 713 (1886).
12. 251 Cal. App.2d 890, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 102 (1967).
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the statement "I can't be the only man in this country with
an eye for a fast buck"; and asserted that he reported one
set of sales figures of his book to his collaborators while
giving a different figure to the press. Defendant's demurrer
was sustained at the trial. The court of appeal reversed,
holding that both of the complained-of statements were
capable of conveying a defamatory meaning. The phrase
"eye for a fast buck" had uncomplimentary overtones, suggestive of unscrupulous business practices, and the claimed
disparity in the sales reports could reasonably be understood
as charging plaintiff with dishonesty, either to the press or
to his collaborators, and if to the latter, a further inference of
dishonesty might reasonably be drawn.

*
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